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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
prevent a review where there appears to have been manifest error in the prior
decision. The court, however, did not discuss the means available to effect such
reviews, nor the particular method used by plaintiff.
The authorities clearly indicate that the Declaratory Judgment Act was
intended neither as a substitute for a new trial, nor as a novel method to ap-
peal a lost suit.2 The Act was designed, instead, for the purpose of allowing a
declaration as to rights, not elsewhere determined,3 over which there is a real
controversy.4 Assuming that there was a valid controversy in 1939, it would
seem that the arguments raised at that time were silenced forever, if not by
the final judgment in that cause, then by the action of the supreme court in
denying the petition for the writ of supervisory control, which was the proper
writ to test the operative effect of the final judgment.5
That questions settled by a court having jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter and parties may not thereafter be relitigated on petition for a declaratory
judgment follows from a consideration of the purposes for which the De-
claratory Judgments Act have been designed." Although the decision of the
court achieved a result which was equitable, the broad application of the pro-
visions of the Declaratory Judgments Act, if followed in future decisions,
would seem to remove the finality of final judgments. 7
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-MEANING OF "ACCOMPANY" AS
USED IN FEDERAL PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT
Petitioner, on seven occasions, shipped drugs and booklets describing the
drugs in the same cartons in interstate commerce. On thirteen other occasions
the literature was shipped separately, and at different times, from the drugs.
Both were displayed together in the retailer's store. The booklets contained
false or misleading information concerning the drugs. Action was brought
2. Avery Freight Lines v. White, 245 Ala. 618, 18 So.2d 394 (1944) ; State ex rel.
Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Terte, 345 Mo. 95, 131 S.V.2d 587 (1939) ; Ferree v. Ferree.
273 Ky. 238, 115 S.W.2d 1055 (1938); Phelps County v. City of Holfrege, 133 Neb.
139, 24 N.W. 483 (1937); Backs Guardian v. Bordo, 234 Ky. 211, 27 S.W.2d 960
(1930) ; see Note, 154 A.L.R. 732 (1945).
3. Strawn v. Sarpy, 146 Neb. 783, 21 N.W.2d 597 (1946).
4. Coff man v. Breeze, 323 U.S. 316 (1944) ; Johnson v. Interstate Transit Lines, 163
F.2d 125 (C.C.A. 10th 1947) ; see Note, 172 A.L.R. 1242 (1948).
5. State ex ref. Finley v. District Court, 99 Mont. 200, 43 P.2d 682 (1935). (The
court explained that the function of the writ of supervisory control is to enable the
supreme court to control the course of litigation in inferior courts where such courts are
proceeding within their jurisdiction, but by mistake of law, or wilful disregard thereof, are
doing gross injustice, and there is no appeal, or remedy by appeal is inadequate.).
6. In Ferree v. Ferree, supra at 238, 115 S.W.2d at 1056, the court said: "Were the
rule otherwise, a proceeding would lie tinder the Declaratory Judgment Acts to determine
whether the judgment passing upon the validity of a prior judgment was proper, and
there would be no end to litigation." Accord, Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Wechler, 34 F.
Supp. 717 (S. D. Fla. 1940): Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co.. 60 Wyo. 417,
154 P.2d 318 (1944) ; State ex rel. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Terte, supra.
7. As to the cognate question whether so broad a construction would serve a useful
purpose generally. see Borchard, The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 18 M .4.
L. REV. 239 (1934).
CASES NOTED
against petitioner for violation of Section 301 (a) of the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, which makes it a crime to introduce misbranded drugs in
interstate commerce,1 Other sections of the Act provide that a drug is
misbranded if its labeling is false or misleading,2 and labeling is defined as
printed matter on or accompanying the drug.3 Held, in resolving a conflict
between the fifth 4 and seventh 5 circuits, that although some of the literature
was shipped separately and at different times, it accompanied the drugs so that
they were misbranded within the meaning of Section 301 (a)." Four justices 7
disagreed as to the thirteen separate shipments, claiming that Section 301 (k)
was more applicable to them.8 Kordel v. United States, 333 U.S. 872 (1948),
rehearing denied, 69 Sup. Ct. 298 (1949).
The Court indicated that a drug is mibranded if its labeling is false or
misleading, 9 and that labeling is defined as printed matter upon or accompany-
ing the drug.' 0 "Accompaniment" should be defined in terms of "textual
relationship," i.e., the criterion is the functional, rather than the physical,
attachment between article and booklet.1 1 It follows that the phrase "accom-
panying such article" is not to be construed narrowly as applying only to
labels on or in the packages to be transported, 12 and that Section 301(a) was
properly invoked on all counts.
The dissenting justices agreed that accompaniment might be found even
where the "labels" did not travel "in the same carton, on the same train, in
the same mail, or delivered for shipment the same day" 12' as the drugs, but
they felt an unfair meaning was being given the word "accompany" with regard
to the thirteen separate shipments. The dissenting opinion pointed out that
the Court is now making it a crime, under Section 301 (a), to introduce drug3
1. 52 STAT. 1042 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1947) (this statute
prohibits, "The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any
food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded").
2. 52 STAT. 1047 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (1940).
3. 52 STAT. 1041 (1938), as amended 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (1940).
4. Urbutet v. United States, 164 F.2d 245 (C.C.A. 7th 1947) (where machines were
shipped at one time and printed matter pertaining thereto was subsequently shipped, it was
held that the printed matter did not "accompany" the machines); accord, Alberty v.
United States, 159 F.2d 278 (C.C.A. 9th 1947) (where the drug was shipped two months
after false labels therefor).
5. Kordel v. United States, 164 F.2d 913 (C.C.A. 7th 1947) (the Court refused to
limit the term "accompany" to mere physical contiguity at time of shipment).
6. See note 1 supra.
7. Mr. Justices Black, Frankfurter, Murphy, and Jackson.
8. Section 301 in relevant part reads as follows: This section prohibits, "The alteration,
mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or reriioval of the whole or any part of the labeling
of, or the doing of any ther act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if
such act is done while such article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce
and results in such article being misbranded."
9. See note 2 supra.
10. See note 3 supra.
11. Accord, United-States v. Urbuteit, 60 Sup. Ct. 112 (1948).
12. Accord, United States v. Lee, 131 F.2d-464 (C.C.A, 7th 1942) ; United States v.
Research Laboratories, Inc., 1.26 F.2d 42 (C.C.A. 9th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 656
(1942).
12a. Kordel v. United States, supra.at I11.
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into interstate commerce, if the drugs should subsequently be misbranded,
even as long as 18 months later, while being held for sale.a1
The minority suggestion that Section 301 (k) rather than Section 301 (a)
should have been applied to the separate shipments is questionable. As the
Court pointed out, Section 301 (k) does not reach situations where the
manufacturer sells directly to the consumer. In addition, it does not apply
to the shipper who first sends literature, and then the drugs, as was the
situation in several of the shipments in the instant case. 14 Moreover, even the
dissenting opinion still leaves doubt as to the line of cleavage between Section
301 (a) and Section 301 (k), since the drugs and literature were shipped only
two days apart in one of the separate shipments.' 5
The Court's holding, on the other hand, is unmistakable. No apparent
hiatus remains in the Act.
TORTS-DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER BY RADIO
Plaintiff alleged defamation of his character arising from a radio speech
made by defendant Hoffman while using the facilities of defendant Trent
Broadcasting Corporation. Plaintiff appealed from an order declaring that
his bill did not state a cause of action against Trent Broadcasting Corporation.
Held, reversing the lower court, that plaintiff's declaration sufficiently stated
a cause of action against defendant broadcasting corporation based on negli-
gence, and an action for defamation of character by radio woild lie. The dis-
senting judge argued that liability should be based on the absolute liability
doctrine. Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143 (N.J. 1948).
The instant case demonstrates the confusion existing witli regard to the
liability of a radio broadcasting company for defamation made by another
while using its facilities. This conflict exists partially because the courts are
not in accord as to what constitutes libel 1 or slander 2 with regard to radio
broadcasts; however, this distinction is not of importance in the present case
as the broadcasted matter was held actionable per se.
13. One of the shipments in question involved laxative tablets, bearing statutorily
adequate labels. They were shipped on July 10, 1942. The mislabeling came through
literature shipped to the same consignee on January 18, 1944, over 18 months later. It
was not claimed that anyone had been harmed by the tablets, but evidence was given that
the booklets contained false staterents concerning their efficacy.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the dissenting opinion is silent as to the
facts in the remaining twelve shipments. In these shipments the time span between drug
and literature shipment dates varied from two to 184 days.
14. See Record, pp. 432,438, containing table showing dates of shipment Brief for
Appellees, pp. 4, 5.
15. See note 13 supro.
1. Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) (libel is a statement
made in some permanent, visible form. Visibility of the writing is not necessary when the
defamatory matter is so widespread and has been disseminated to such a large number of
people that it takes on the characteristic of permanence). See Note, 171 A.L.R. 765 (1947).
2. Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (1937) (slander is a statement in
spoken words or other transitory form. Words transmitted over the air waves do not have
